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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After  the  district  court  dismissed  a  withheld  judgment  against  Matthew  Joseph
Abramowski, he requested the district court seal his case.  At the hearing on the motion to seal,
he also requested the district court expunge his case.  The district court indicated it would grant
the request for expungement if it had the legal authority, but suggested Mr. Abramowski should
file a separate motion to give proper notice to the State.  The district court sealed the records of
the juvenile proceedings in the case, finding Mr. Abramowski had been unable to secure
employment and independent living opportunities.
Mr. Abramowski then filed a motion for expungement under Idaho Court Administrative
Rule 32 (Rule 32), and explained his difficulties with finding a job or housing stemmed from his
criminal history being a matter of public record.  The district court, with a different judge now
presiding over the case, denied the motion for expungement.  Mr. Abramowski filed a motion to
reconsider, and at the hearing on the motion, presented additional information on his inability to
secure employment and independent living opportunities because his criminal history was
available to the public.  The district court denied the motion to reconsider.
On appeal, Mr. Abramowski asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his requests for expungement.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At the age of fifteen, Mr. Abramowski liked to write stories,  hang out with his friends,
and play video games.  (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4.)  He also practiced the
martial art Kajukembo and enjoyed the times he went to church.  (See PSI, pp.3-4.)
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By the time he was fifteen, Mr. Abramowski also had diagnoses for Asperger’s Disorder
and Autistic Disorder.  (See Competency Hearing State’s Ex. 1, p.2.)1  Indeed, Mr. Abramowski
has an autism spectrum disorder.  (See Conf. Docs., pp.778-79.)2  However, Mr. Abramowski “is
high functioning without any intellectual impairment.”  (Conf. Docs., p.779.)  One evaluator
wrote, “[s]ocial, developmental and emotional differences have reportedly been present since
early childhood.”  (Competency Hearing Def. Ex. A, p.2.)  Mr. Abramowski’s presentence
investigator stated that, arguably, he “may always relate to the world as a person younger than
his chronological age.”  (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Abramowski’s mother had homeschooled him from the third grade through the fifth
grade.  (See Competency Hearing Def. Ex. A., p.3; Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D, Mental Evaluation,
May 19, 2010 (hereinafter, Beaver Mental Evaluation), p.5.)3  Mr. Abramowski and his family
then moved to Idaho, and he went into public school. (See Beaver Mental Evaluation, p.6.)
Mr. Abramowski had been in a special education program for stuttering that provided him a
classroom aide, but the school district took him out of the program when he entered high school.
(See Competency Hearing Def. Ex. A., p.2; Beaver Mental Evaluation, p.6.)
Other students would bully Mr. Abramowski.  (See Beaver Mental Evaluation, p.5.)  His
freshman  year  at  high  school  was  no  exception.   (See Competency Hearing Def. Ex. A, p.2.)
One of his friends reported almost everyone in Mr. Abramowski’s classes would bully him,
1 State’s Exhibit 1 and Defendant’s Exhibit A were admitted at a competency hearing held on
October 30, 2009.  Those exhibits may be found in the 27-page PDF document “Abramowski
45296 ex.pdf”.
2 The Sealed or Confidential Documents may be found in the 295-page PDF document
“Abramowski 45296 conf.pdf”.  Please note the pagination in the PDF begins with Page 486.
3 The  Beaver  Mental  Evaluation  was  the  subject  of  Mr.  Ambramowski’s  Motion  to  Augment,
which the Idaho Supreme Court granted.  (See Order  Granting  Motion  to  Augment  and  to
Suspend the Briefing Schedule, Apr. 2, 2018.)
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through acts such as stealing his clothes from his locker, pushing down on the bench press bar
when he was lifting weights, and embarrassing him.  (See Competency Hearing Def. Ex. A, p.2.)
Mr. Abramowski had considerable difficulties with communicating his thoughts and
feelings.   (See Beaver Mental Evaluation, p.2.)  His parents were unaware of the full extent of
the bullying.  (See Beaver Mental Evaluation, p.6.)  At one point, Mr. Abramowski attempted to
run  away  from  home.   (See Competency Hearing Def. Ex. A, p.1.)  A few months later in
April 2009, about a month after he turned fifteen, he set a fire in his home while his parents were
sleeping.  (See Competency Hearing State’s Ex. 1, p.1.)  Years later, Mr. Abramowski’s counsel
explained the incident happened “because he wasn’t able to articulate what was happening to
him and the breakdown he was going through due to the bullying and what was happening to
him when he was going to school.  He didn’t have the skill set to reach out.”  (See Tr. June 15,
2017, p.10, Ls.3-9.)
The State charged Mr. Abramowski with arson in the first degree, felony, I.C. § 18-
802(1).  (See Sealed R., p.203.)4  After  Mr.  Abramowski  pleaded  guilty,  the  district  court
withheld judgment and placed him on probation for a period of ten years.  (See Sealed
R., pp.203-07; Tr. June 21, 2010, p.69, L.23 – p.70, L.9.)  The district court initially placed him
under the control of juvenile authorities, with supervision to be transferred to adult authorities by
the time he turned twenty-one.  (Tr. June 21, 2010, p.70, Ls.2-25.)
Overall, Mr. Abramowski did “extremely well on probation.”  (Conf. Docs., p.755.)  In
early 2015, his juvenile probation officer wrote in an update memorandum to the district court
that Mr. Abramowski “has been in full compliance with no violations to report.”  (Conf. Docs.,
4 The Sealed Record may be found in the 290-page PDF document “Abramowski 45296 cr seal
2010-2015.pdf”.  Please note the pagination in the PDF begins with Page 196.
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p.755.)  Mr. Abramowski attended school, enrolled in an online course at a community college,
volunteered with a non-profit organization that worked with people with a diagnosis on the
autism spectrum, and actively engaged in ongoing treatment sessions.  (See Conf. Docs., p.755.)
Around the same time, Mr. Abramowski’s mother wrote a statement to the district court
on how much Mr. Abramowski had been through, and on how much he had progressed due to
his hard work, treatment providers, support from the autism community, family, and friends, as
well as taxpayer funds. (See Conf. Docs., pp.766-769.)  She knew that Mr. Abramowski “wishes
someday to be able to not be the recipient of those funds, but to be one that is contributing to
help others.”  (Conf. Docs., p.769.)
Later in 2015, after Mr. Abramowski turned twenty-one years old, he requested the
district court either terminate probation and dismiss the case, or alternatively, place him on adult
unsupervised probation.  (See R., p.127; Sealed R., p.475.)  The district court appointed
Chad Sombke, Ph.D., to examine and report upon the mental condition of Mr. Abramowski.
(R., pp.127-30.)  Dr. Sombke found Mr. Abramowski could be considered a low risk to the
community at large.  (See Conf. Docs., p.780.)  The district court subsequently converted
Mr. Abramowksi’s supervision from supervised juvenile probation to unsupervised (Court)
probation for a period of four years.  (See Sealed R., pp.478-81.)
In March 2017, Mr. Abramowski filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2604(1)(b)(i).  (R., p.141.)  The district court terminated the sentence, set aside the plea of guilty,
dismissed the case, and finally discharged Mr. Abramowski.  (R., p.144.)
Mr.  Abramowski  then  filed  a  Motion  to  Seal,  requesting  the  district  court  seal  his  case
from the Idaho Criminal Repository pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i).
(R., p.146.)  At the hearing on the motion to seal, Mr. Abramowski further requested the district
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court “expunge[]” the case.  (See Tr. Mar. 29, 2017, p.3, L.23 – p.5, L.7.)  He had been having
difficulty “with the fact that this information is public on a repository.  And to the extent that the
Court has the authority to remove that from the repository, that would be a concern” of
Mr. Abramowski and his family.  (See Tr. Mar. 29, 2017, p.4, Ls.3-7.)  Mr. Abramowski asserted
he had been having trouble finding housing and employment because potential landlords and
employers were able to find his charges, which was causing him economic harm.  (See
Tr. Mar. 29, 2017, p.4, Ls.7-12.)
The district court determined the request for expungement was different from what
Mr.  Abramowski  had  raised  in  the  motion  to  seal,  and  suggested  he  file  a  separate  motion  for
expungement to give proper notice to the State.  (See Tr. Mar. 29, 2017, p.6, L.15 – p.7, L.19.)
The district court observed, “I don’t think there will be time for you to do that before I leave the
bench,  and  so  that  will  be  something  that  will  be  addressed  by  my  successor.”   (Tr.  Mar.  29,
2017, p.6, L.25 – p.7, L.2.)  The district court also stated, “[f]or the record, if I felt that I had
legal  authority  to  expunge,  I  would  exercise  discretion  in  this  case  to  grant  that.   I  think  that
Mr. Abramowski has earned some additional consideration from the Court and, for what it’s
worth, I would exercise some discretion with that in mind.”  (Tr. Mar. 29, 2017, p.7, Ls.3-9.)
The district court ordered the mental health evaluation records in Mr. Abramowski’s case
sealed pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(g)(17).  (See R., pp.149-51.)  The district court also ordered the
records from the juvenile proceedings sealed under I.C.A.R. 32(g)(9).  (R., pp.149-50.)  The
district court found, “extraordinary circumstances exist which justify that such records should be
confidential. The extraordinary circumstances consist of limitations which relate to
Abramowski’s autism spectrum disorder.  Due to these limitations, Abramowski has been unable
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to secure employment and independent living opportunities that would not have similar effects
on a person without such limitations.”  (R., p.150.)
Mr. Abramowski filed a Motion for Expungement, under I.C.A.R. 32(i).  (R., pp.154-55.)
He asserted he had “autism and psychiatric limitations and significant developmental disabilities.
Because of these diagnoses, the Court has already made findings that ‘extraordinary
circumstances exist’ that have resulted in ‘inability to secure employment and independent living
opportunities.’”  (R., p.155.)  Mr. Abramowski asserted, “[t]hese findings are also enough to
warrant ‘expungement’ of his criminal record under I.C.A.R. 32(i).”  (R., p.155.)
In the meantime, the presiding judge retired and Mr. Abramowski’s case was temporarily
assigned to a senior judge.  (See R., p.172.)  At the hearing on the motion for expungement
before the senior judge, Mr. Abramowski explained that his mother, who was also his legal
guardian, was concerned “that with this available to the public record,” he “has had trouble
finding a job.”  (See Tr. June 15, 2017, p.10, Ls.15-25.)5  While Mr. Abramowski worked about
one  hour  a  week  as  a  public  television  cameraman,  and  wanted  to  work,  he  was  “having
difficulty finding employment when people search and do a background check and find this on
his record.”  (See Tr. June 15, 2017, p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.4.)  His mother’s concern was that,
“when or should she pass away, how will he be able to support himself and care for himself if he
has this record, and so, of course, she’s concerned that he be set up to be as independent and
stable as he can be in the future and this leaves him unable to find housing and employment and
support himself.”  (Tr. June 15, 2017, p.11, Ls.5-11.)  Mr. Abramowski reminded the district
court that the previous judge had already made findings “to support an order of expungement.”
(See Tr. June 15, 2017, p.11, Ls.12-15.)
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Later, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendant’s
Motion to Expunge Record.  (R., pp.172-74.)  The district court wrote that the previous judge
“already has granted some expungement relief to the defendant.”  (R., p.173.)  The district court
determined, “[i]n a case such as this, involving a type of serious and potentially dangerous
criminal act, the public interest predominates over the defendant’s privacy interest.”  (R., p.173.)
Thus, the district court denied the motion for expungement.  (R., p.173.)
Mr.  Abramowski  filed  a  Motion  to  Reconsider  Order  Denying  Motion  to  Expunge.
(R., p.176.)  Attached to the motion to reconsider was a letter from an affordable housing
organization, denying Mr. Abramowski’s application for an apartment.  (See R., p.177.)  The
letter stated, “[t]his decision to decline your application was based on information obtained from
previous landlords or references listed on your application for housing and/or credit bureau
report or criminal history reports.”  (R., p.177.)
Mr. Abramowski’s mother testified at the hearing on the motion to reconsider.
(Tr. July 19, 2017, p.19, Ls.4-25.)  She testified Mr. Abramowski lived with his parents, who had
full legal guardianship and conservatorship.  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.19, Ls.19-25.)  The
conservatorship authorized her to look after his finances.  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.20, Ls.1-6.)  She
testified Mr. Abramowski never had a credit card or any sort of credit history.  (Tr. July 19,
2017, p.20, Ls.10-18, p.25, L.25 – p.26, L.3.)  She suggested he was on SSI benefits.  (See
Tr. July 19, 2017, p.22, Ls.16-24.)   Mr. Abramowski’s mother further explained that her son had
been hired as a cameraman because his employer would get a tax credit.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017,
p.22, Ls.3-15.)
5 Please note the transcript for the June 15, 2017 hearing does not have individual page numbers,
although line numbers do appear on the pages.
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Mr. Abramowski also had not had any previous landlords, other than his parents, and his
mother testified she had not given any information to anyone that would aid them in denying the
application.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.25, Ls.1-9.)  Mr. Abramowski’s mother testified the
references listed in his application were probably two separate people from Mr. Abramowski’s
church,  who  were  in  charge  of  the  departments  where  he  had  done  volunteer  work.   (See
Tr. July 19, 2017, p.25, Ls.14-24.)  In her opinion, that left only the criminal history reports as a
reason to deny the application.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.26, Ls.7-9.)
Neil  Jarski,  Mr.  Abramowski’s  developmental  therapist,  also  testified.   (Tr.  July  19,
2017, p.7, Ls.6-19.)  Mr. Jarski testified Mr. Abramowski had completed four housing
applications.  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.13, Ls.14-17.)  Mr. Abramowski did get contacted about one
application, but it did not work out because the location was in Meridian far from any bus stops,
and Mr. Abramowski was going to school in Boise.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.13, Ls.2-10.)
Additionally, Mr. Jarski testified Mr. Abramowski had been working as a cameraman for
about six months, but no more than an hour or two per week.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.8, L.16 –
p.9, L.5.)  Before that, he had only done volunteer work.  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.9, Ls.6-11.)
Mr. Jarski testified Mr. Abramowski had filled out lots of job applications, and had also
gone through vocational rehabilitation for help getting a permanent job.  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.9,
L.15 – p.10, L.7.)  Mr. Abramowski had actually gone through vocational rehabilitation twice,
where usually participants only went through it once.  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.10, Ls.8-14.)
Mr. Jarski estimated Mr. Abramowski had filled out 80 to 90 job applications when he was doing
vocational rehabilitation.  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.11, Ls.1-13.)  However, Mr. Abramowski only
had two callbacks:  one with a restaurant which rejected him after an evaluation, and the other
with  the  public  television  station  that  hired  him.   (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.12, Ls.2-10.)  On
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cross-examination, Mr. Jarski testified they had never been specifically informed on why
Mr. Abramowski had been denied.  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.16, Ls.18-20.)
Mr. Abramowski asserted, “it’s the defense’s position that the reason that Matthew has
been submitting so many applications for job employment and receiving no callbacks is because
of his criminal record and his criminal history.”  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.28, Ls.15-19.)  He also
asserted, “the only reason that he has been denied housing would then be left to his criminal
history and those reports.”  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.28, Ls.23-25.)  He requested the district court
“further expunge his record, so that when he is putting in for housing and employment and folks
go to search his background, this doesn’t come up and then immediately cause him to not be
called back in or to get a job or to get housing.”  (Tr. July 19, 2017, p.29, Ls.7-11.)
The district court subsequently issued a Memorandum and Order Concerning
Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider.  (R., pp.182-84.)  The district court wrote, “[a]lthough not
stated in the memorandum [denying the initial motion for expungement], a primary consideration
was the undisputed fact that the defendant actually committed the acts constituting arson in the
first degree, even though as a matter of law the charge ultimately was dismissed following
successful  completion  of  a  period  of  probation.”   (R.,  p.183.)   The  district  court,  after  the
hearing, had “reviewed the entire written record of this case, which demonstrated that the
defendant did well on probation.”  (R., p.183.)  The district court, “[h]aving considered the
additional evidence and argument presented on behalf of the defendant,” still concluded “that the
public interest outweighs the defendant’s privacy interest.”  (R., p.183.)  Thus, the district court
denied the motion to reconsider.  (R., p.183.)
Mr. Abramowski filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Memorandum
and Order Concerning Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider.  (R., pp.185-87.)
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ISSUE




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Abramowski’s Requests
For Expungement
A. Introduction
Mr.  Abramowski  asserts  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion  when  it  denied  his
requests for expungement.  The district court, when it denied the initial motion for expungement,
and when it denied the motion for reconsideration, did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards.  The district court should have found that Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy
predominated over the interest in public disclosure, because the dissemination of the materials
related to the case would reasonably result—and had already resulted—in economic or financial
loss or harm to Mr. Abramowski.
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
An  appellate  court  reviews  a  district  court’s  order  on  an  Idaho  Court  Administrative
Rule 32(i) motion for expungement for an abuse of discretion. State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 869,
872 (2009).  When an appellate court reviews an exercise of discretion, it conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry into whether the district court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, whether the
district court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices, and whether the district court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
A district court deciding a motion for reconsideration applies the same standard of review
that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. Westby v.
Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 621 (2014).  “If the original order was within the trial court’s
discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion to reconsider.” Id.  When an
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appellate court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration,
the appellate court uses the same standard of review the district court used in deciding the motion
for reconsideration. Id.
In Turpen, the Idaho Supreme Court held it did not contemplate “expungement” in Idaho
included the destruction of public records:  “[W]hen we refer to expungement, we mean the
issuance of a court order requiring physical or electronic sequestration of such records from
public  access  or  inspection.   Thus,  when we refer  to  ‘expungement’  we  do  so  in  the  narrower
sense of ‘expungement of record’ which is defined as the ‘[p]rocess by which [a] record of
criminal conviction is destroyed or sealed . . . .’” Turpen, 147 Idaho at 870-71.  Considering the
previous judge here treated the request to seal the case as a discrete motion, Mr. Abramowski’s
requests for expungement were for the district court to redact the case materials so they would
not show up in a state public records search.  (See Tr. Mar. 29, 2017, p.4, Ls.3-7; Tr. July 19,
2017, p.29, Ls.5-11.)
The Turpen Court  held that Rule 32(i)  “authorizes the trial  court  to seal  or redact court
records on a case-by-case basis.  The rule requires the custodian judge to hold a hearing and
make a factual finding as to whether the individual’s interest in privacy or whether the interest in
public disclosure predominates.” Turpen, 147 Idaho at 871.  “If the court redacts or seals records
to protect predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the least restrictive exception from
disclosure consistent with privacy interests.” Id. (quoting I.C.A.R. 32(i)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Rule 32(i) currently provides that before a court may enter an order redacting or sealing
records, it must also make one or more of the following determinations in writing:
(A) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or statements,
the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, or
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(B) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that the court
finds might be libelous, or
(C) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, the dissemination
or publication of which may compromise the financial security of, or could
reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to, a person having an
interest  in the documents or materials,  or compromise the security of personnel,
records or public property of or used by the judicial department, or
(D) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that might
threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or
(E) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents or materials to
preserve the right to a fair trial, or
(F) That the documents contain personal data identifiers that should have been
redacted pursuant to Rule 2.6 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, in which case
the court shall order that the documents be redacted in a manner consistent with
the provisions of that rule.
I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2). “In determining whether to grant a request to seal or redact records, trial courts
are expected to apply ‘the traditional legal concepts in the law of invasion of privacy,
defamation, and invasion of proprietary business records as well as common sense respect for
shielding highly intimate material about persons.’” Turpen, 147 Idaho at 872 (quoting
I.C.A.R. 32(i)).
C. The  District  Court  Abused  Its  Discretion  When  It  Denied  Mr.  Abramowski’s  Initial
Motion  For  Expungement,  Because  The  District  Court  Did  Not  Act  Consistently  With
The Applicable Legal Standards
Mr. Abramowski asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his initial
motion for expungement, because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable
legal standards.  The district court should have found that Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy
predominated over the interest in public disclosure, because the dissemination of the materials
related  to  the  case  would  reasonably  result,  and  had  already  resulted,  in  economic  or  financial
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loss or harm to Mr. Abramowski; namely, his inability to secure employment and independent
living opportunities.
Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy predominated over the interest in public disclosure,
because the dissemination of the materials related to the case would reasonably result in
economic or financial loss or harm to Mr. Abramowski.  The previous judge’s findings indicated
Mr. Abramowski had already suffered economic or financial loss or harm.  When the previous
judge ordered the records from the juvenile proceedings sealed under I.C.A.R. 32(g)(9),6 the
judge found “that extraordinary circumstances exist which justify that such records should be
confidential.  The extraordinary circumstances consist of limitations which relate to
Abramowski’s autism spectrum disorder.  Due to these limitations, Abramowski has been unable
to secure employment and independent living opportunities that would not have similar effects
on a person without such limitations.”  (R., p.150.)
At the hearing on the motion for expungement, Mr. Abramowski explained that while he
was working about an hour a week as a public television cameraman, he was “having difficulty
finding employment when people search and do a background check and find this on his record.”
(Tr. June 15, 2017, p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.4.)  His mother was worried Mr. Abramowski would
continue to experience economic losses in the future; she was concerned “that he be set up to be
as independent and stable as he can be in the future and that this leaves him unable to find
housing and employment and support himself.”  (Tr. June 15, 2017, p.11, Ls.5-11.)
6 I.C.A.R. 32(g)(9) provides that “[c]ourt records of Juvenile Corrections Act proceedings
brought against a juvenile fourteen (14) years or older who is charged with an act which would
be a felony if committed by an adult, shall be exempt from disclosure if the court determines
upon a written order made in each case that extraordinary circumstances exist which justify that
the records should be confidential.”  I.C.A.R. 32(g)(9)(B)(2).
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Mr. Abramowski also indicated the public interest in disclosure did not predominate,
asserting at the hearing that “[t]his was a family matter, and I think that it was a culmination of
events that are not likely to occur.”  (Tr. June 15, 2017, p.11, Ls.18-23.)  Mr. Abramowski had
explained that the incident originated from his mental breakdown caused by the bullying he was
subjected to at school, and his inability to articulate what was happening to him.  (See
Tr. June 15, 2017, p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.14.)  Mr. Abramowski had since graduated from school
and was undergoing treatment.  (See Tr. June 15, 2017, p.11, Ls.23-24.)
Thus, Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy predominated over the interest in public
disclosure, because the dissemination of the materials related to the case would reasonably result,
and had already resulted, in economic or financial loss or harm to Mr. Abramowski. See Turpen,
147 Idaho at 871-72; I.C.A.R. 32(i).  The district court abused its discretion when it denied
Mr. Abramowski’s initial motion for expungement, because the district court did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Abramowski’s Motion For
Reconsideration,  Because  The  District  Court  Did  Not  Act  Consistently  With  The
Applicable Legal Standards
Mr. Abramowski asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
for reconsideration, because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards.  In light of the additional evidence presented in support of the motion for
reconsideration, the district court should have found that Mr. Abramowski’s interest in privacy
predominated over the interest in public disclosure, because the dissemination of the materials
related to the case had resulted in economic or financial loss or harm to Mr. Abramowski.
The additional evidence presented included information on Mr. Abramowski’s
difficulties  with  finding  employment.   Although  Mr.  Abramowski  was  still  working  as  a
16
cameraman, his already-meager hours were declining.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.23, Ls.1-9.)  His
mother reported that his highest monthly paycheck had only been for $80.00.  (Tr. July 19, 2017,
p.23, Ls.7-9.)  Mr. Jarski testified Mr. Abramowski had only received two callbacks for job
opportunities, even though he had submitted some 80 to 90 job applications and completed
vocational rehabilitation twice.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.9, L.15 – p.12, L.13.)
Mr. Abramowski also presented additional evidence on his inability to secure
independent living opportunities.  The letter from the housing organization stated that the
decision to decline Mr. Abramowski’s application for an apartment “was based on information
obtained from previous landlords or references listed on your application for housing and/or
credit bureau report or criminal history reports.”  (R., p.178.)  However, Mr. Abramowski’s
mother testified that his only previous landlords were his parents, and she had not provided any
information to support a denial; his references were from his church; and he did not have a credit
history of which she was aware.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.20, Ls.7-18, p.24, L.20 – p.26, L.6.)
That left Mr. Abramowski’s criminal history report as the only reason the housing organization
denied his apartment application.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.26, Ls.7-9.)
Moreover, the district court’s full review of the record, undertaken before it ruled on the
motion to reconsider, would have shown Mr. Abramowski’s privacy interest predominated over
the public disclosure interest.  The district court verified it had “reviewed the entire written
record of this case” following the hearing on the motion to reconsider.  (See R., p.183.)
The district court’s review of the record would have further indicated Mr. Abramowski
has, without his expungement request being granted, suffered economic loss.  In a 2015
statement to the district court, Ms. Abramowski’s mother wrote of her son’s progress, aided in
part by taxpayer funds.  (See Conf. Docs., p.769.)  She stated, “I know that Matthew wishes
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someday to be able to not be the recipient of those funds, but to be one that is contributing to
help others.”  (Conf. Docs., p.769.)  However, Mr. Abramowski has not been able to contribute
to society as he wished, seeing as the only job he has been able to secure has paid him, at most,
$80.00 a month.  (See Tr. July 19, 2017, p.23, Ls.1-9.)  Additionally, Mr. Abramowski’s mother
testified Mr. Abramowski received that job because his employer would get a tax credit.  (See
Tr., July 19, 2017, p.22, Ls.3-15.)  Mr. Abramowski would have to find a different job to escape
his dependency on taxpayer funds, and the availability of his criminal history to the public has
left him unable to do so.
A review of the record would have also suggested Mr. Abramowski presents a low risk to
the community, reducing the interest in public disclosure.  Dr. Sombke’s 2015 psychological
evaluation stated that Mr. Abramowski “does not have a substance use history and his only
violent  criminal  act  was  his  instant  offense  when  he  was  14  or  15  years  old.”   (Conf.  Docs.,
p.779.)  According to Dr. Sombke, Mr. Abramowski “has not had any other incidents of
engaging in violence and he does not have any probation violations.”  (Conf. Docs., p.780.)
Dr. Sombke further wrote, “Mr. Abramowski can be considered a low risk to the community at
large  and  he  will  continue  to  be  a  low  risk  as  long  as  his  treatment  and  supports  in  the
community remain in place.”  (Conf. Docs., p.780.)
In sum, based on the additional information provided in support of the motion for
reconsideration,  and  a  full  review  of  the  record,  Mr.  Abramowski’s  interest  in  privacy
predominated over the interest in public disclosure.  The dissemination of the materials related to
the case had resulted in economic or financial loss or harm to Mr. Abramowski. See Turpen, 147
Idaho at 870-71; I.C.A.R. 32(i).  Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied
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Mr. Abramowski’s motion to reconsider, because the district court did not act consistently with
the applicable legal standards. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Abramowski respectfully requests this this Court vacate the
district court’s order denying the motion for expungement, as well as the district court’s order
denying the motion for reconsideration, and remand his case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of April, 2018.
_________/s/________________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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